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Abstract
During the execution of a Composite Web Service (CWS), diﬀerent faults may occur that cause WSs fail-
ures. There exist strategies that can be applied to repair these failures, such as: WS retry, WS substitution,
compensation, roll-back, or replication. Each strategy has advantages and disadvantages on diﬀerent ex-
ecution scenarios and can produce diﬀerent impact on the CWS QoS. Hence, it is important to deﬁne
a dynamic fault tolerant strategy which takes into account environment and execution information to ac-
cordingly decide the appropriate recovery strategy. We present a preliminary study in order to analyze the
impact on the CWS total execution time of diﬀerent recovery strategies on diﬀerent scenarios. The exper-
imental results show that under diﬀerent conditions, recovery strategies behave diﬀerently. This analysis
represents a ﬁrst step towards the deﬁnition of a model to dynamically decide which recovery strategy is
the best choice by taking into account the context-information when the failure occurs.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, SOA architecture is used as a platform for business applications for
accessing data and services in distributed environments. The constantly increasing
number of such applications currently deployed over the Internet is enabled by
the latest SOA techniques, such as Web Services (WS) and Web 3.0, and is a
consequence of the need for business integration and collaboration. With machine
intelligence, users can resolve complex problems that require the interaction among
diﬀerent tasks. One of the major goals of the Web 3.0 is to support automatic and
transparent WS composition and execution, allowing a complex user request to be
satisﬁed by a Composite Web Service (CWS). Hence, in a CWS, functionalities
of individual WSs (possibly from diﬀerent providers) are combined to resolve the
complex query [2].
Most of the generic or domain-tailored solutions for creating, executing, and
managing such CWSs have been extensively treated in the literature, exhibit-
ing sophisticated interfaces and a multitude of connectors to subsystems to rep-
resent functional properties, and increasing support for non-functional proper-
ties [5,3,13,17,11,6,15]. Nevertheless, recovery of failures for reliable execution have
received relatively limited attention.
During the execution of a CWS, diﬀerent faults may occur that cause a WS fail-
ure. However, a fault-tolerant CWS is the one that, upon a service failure, ends up
the whole composite service (e.g., by retrying, substituting, or replicating the faulty
WS) or leaves the execution in a safe state (e.g., by rollbacking or compensating
the faulty WS and the related executed WSs). In this sense, fault tolerant CWS
becomes a key mechanism to cope with challenges of open-world applications in
dynamic changing and untrusted operating environments to ensure that the whole
system remains in a consistent state even in the presence of failures [23].
Several techniques have been proposed to implement fault tolerant CWS exe-
cution. In some works, transactional properties of component WSs (e.g., retriable,
compensable or not) are considered to ensure the classical ACID (all-or-nothing)
properties in CWSs [13,11,6,15,9,4]. In this context, failures during the execution
of a CWS can be repaired by backward or forward recovery processes. Backward
recovery implies to undo the work done until the failure and go back to the ini-
tial consistent state (before the execution started), by roll-back or compensation
techniques. Forward recovery tries to repair the failure and continue the execution,
using retry and substitution, for example. In previous works, we presented our
solutions based on backward and forward recovery [8,10].
However, backward recovery means that users do not get the desired answer to
their queries, besides roll-back techniques that claim for logs in persistent storage to
enable recovery after a re-start, reboot, or crash. The need for synchronous logging
slows down the execution speed during normal operation and the reliability of these
mechanisms depends on the reliability of the storage. Forward recovery could imply
long waiting times, due of the invested time to repair failures until users ﬁnally get
the response.
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Others works consider replication of WSs instead of transactional properties to
provide forward recovery. With this strategy, several equivalent WSs are simultane-
ously invoked and the response is taken from the ﬁrst successfully ﬁnished one [28,1].
Because WSs can be created and updated on-the-ﬂy, the execution system needs to
dynamically detect changes during run-time, and adapt execution to the availabil-
ity of the existing WSs. Replicating a service creates the need for mechanisms to
distribute messages, order requests, and coordinate replicas. However, sometimes
it is not possible to replicate the invocation of several equivalent WSs or substitute
the faulty WS for an equivalent one, because equivalent WSs are not available or
because the extra consumption of resources.
Each strategy has advantages and disadvantages on diﬀerent scenarios. These
scenarios can be deﬁned by, for example, the execution state at the moment of the
failure (e.g., how many WSs have been successfully executed, how many WSs have
not been invoked), the impact of the recovery strategy in the QoS of the CWS,
and the stability and reliability of the system. Are all recovery techniques equally
practical, eﬀective, and eﬃcient? When is it better to apply backward or forward
recovery? Is replication the best strategy? Some replicas may become unavailable
permanently, while some new replicas may join in. WSs may be updated without
any notiﬁcation, and the Internet traﬃc load and server workload are also changing
from time to time. Persistent storage can be available or not. These unpredictable
characteristics of WS environments provide a challenge for optimal fault tolerance
strategy determination. There is an urgent need for more general and smarter fault
tolerance strategies, which are context-information aware and can be dynamically
and automatically reconﬁgured for meeting diﬀerent user requirements and changing
environments.
Focused on that need, in this paper we present a study to analyze the impact
on the CWS total execution time of diﬀerent recovery strategies in diﬀerent sce-
narios. We focus on backward, forward, and replication recovery techniques. The
experimental results show that recovery strategies behave diﬀerently under diﬀerent
conditions. This analysis represents a ﬁrst step towards the deﬁnition of a model to
dynamically decide which recovery strategy is the best choice taking into account
the execution state when a failure occurs, context-information, and the impact on
the QoS.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes
the most important concepts related to fault tolerance in CWS. In Section 3 we
characterize the CWS and the environment in terms of execution time a the basis
of our study. The experimental study is presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents
relevant related works. Finally, our conclusions and future work are presented in
Section 6.
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2 Fault Tolerance for Composite Web Services: the
background
This section recalls some important concepts regarding Composite Web Service
(CWS) execution and the most important recovery approaches implemented in
this area. We also describe a classiﬁcation of failures that can aﬀect the CWS
execution and point out which are considered in this work.
2.1 Composite Web Service
A Composite Web Service, denoted as CWS, is a combination of several WSs to
produce more complex services that satisfy more complex user requests. It concerns
which and how WSs are combined to obtain the desired results. A CWS can be
represented in structures such as workﬂows, graphs, or Petri Nets indicating, for
example, the control ﬂow, data ﬂow, WSs execution order, and/or WSs behavior.
The structure representing a CWS can be manually or automatically generated.
Users can manually specify how functionality of WSs are combined or a “composer
agent” can automatically decide which and how WSs are combined, according the
desired query. In both cases, the execution of a CWS is carried out by an “execution
engine” that invokes the WSs respecting such structure. In this paper, we consider
a CWS represented by a graph, formally deﬁned in Def. 2.1.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Composite Web Service Graph. A Composite Web Service
Graph, denoted as G = (V,E), is a directed acyclic graph with the following con-
siderations:
• Nodes in V represent the component WSs, such that V = {wsi, i = 1..m} and
wsi is a component WS.
• Arcs in E denote the execution ﬂow among component WSs. Execution ﬂow
is deﬁned by data or control ﬂow relationships between two services. Data ﬂow
relationship is deﬁned in terms of service input/output attributes, such that out-
put values produced by a WS are part of the input parameters of another WS.
Control ﬂow relationship is deﬁned by execution order restrictions (e.g., business
process order, transactional property, concurrence control, deadlock avoidance)
that dictate that aWS has to be executed after anotherWS ﬁnishes its execution.
Control ﬂow can be designated by control signals (as well called control data).
Thus, if wsi, wsj ∈ V and (wsi, wsj) ∈ E, then wsi produces output attributes
from which at least one is an input parameter of service wsj and/or wsj has to
wait for a control signal from wsi. In other words, if O(wsi) represents the set
of output attributes and control signals that wsi produces and I(wsj) represents
the set of input parameters and control signals needed to invoke wsj , then O(wsi)
∩ I(wsj) = ∅.
• Entry nodes represent WSs whose input attributes are provided by the user, then
∃ wsi ∈ V : I(wsi) = ∅.
• Output nodes represent WSs that produce the ﬁnal desired output attributes to
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the user, then ∃ wsi ∈ V : O(wsi) = ∅.
Note that workﬂows, bipartite graphs, and Petri Nets, the most popular struc-
tures used to represent CWS, can be matched to our graph deﬁnition.
2.2 CWS control execution
The execution of a CWS implies the invocation of all component WSs according to
the execution ﬂow imposed by the structure representing theCWS (Def. 2.1). Thus,
there exist two basic variants of execution scenarios. In a sequential scenario, some
WSs cannot be invoked until previous services have ﬁnished, because they work on
the results of previous services or some control restrictions impose sequentiality. In
a parallel scenario, several services can be invoked simultaneously because they do
not have data or control ﬂow dependencies.
The execution control can be centralized or distributed. Centralized approaches
consider a coordinator managing the whole execution process [20,26]. In distributed
approaches, the execution process proceeds with collaboration of several participants
without a central coordinator [4,1]. On the other hand, the execution control could
be attached to the WS [13,15] or it could be independent of its implementation
[9]. Some execution engines, such as the IBM framework BPWS4J 4 or the open
source Orchestra 5 solutions actually execute CWS speciﬁed with BPEL4WS in a
centralized fashion and the execution control is attached to WSs.
In this work, we consider distributed execution engine and execution control
independent of WSs implementation.
2.3 Failures classiﬁcation
During the execution of a CWS, failures can occur at multiple levels: hardware, op-
erating system, web services, execution engine, and network. These failures result in
reduced performance and can cause diﬀerent behaviors in the execution. According
the nature of failures, we divide faults into two types:
• Silent faults. These kind of faults are generic to all WSs and cause WSs to not
respond because they are not available or a crash occurred in the platform. Some
examples of silent faults are (i) communication timeout, (ii) service unavailable,
(iii) bad gateway, and (iv) server error. Silent faults can be easily identiﬁed by
the execution engine.
• Logic faults. Logic faults are speciﬁc to diﬀerent WSs and are caused by error
in inputs attributes (e.g., bad format, out of valid range, calculation faults) and
byzantine faults (the WS still responds to invocation but in a wrong way). Also,
various exceptions thrown by the WS to the service users are classiﬁed into the
logic-related faults. It is diﬃcult for the execution engine to identify such type of
faults.
4 Business Process for Web Services JavaTM, http://www.alphaworks.ibm.com/tech/bpws4j - Extracted
on April 2013
5 Orchestra,http://orchestra.ow2.org/xwiki/bin/view/
M ain/WebHome - Extracted on April 2013
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Regarding faults, in this paper we consider: (i) the execution engines run far
from WS hosts, in reliable servers such as clusters computing, they do not fail,
their data network is highly secure, and they are not aﬀected by WS faults (the
execution control is detached from WSs); and (ii) component WSs can suﬀer silent
failures; run-time failures caused by logic faults are not considered.
2.4 Fault tolerant CWS execution
Some execution engines are capable to manage failures during the execution. Ones
are based on exception handling[21,18], others are based on transactional proper-
ties [11,4,7], some others use a combination of both approaches [13,15], and others
base the fault tolerance on replication techniques [28,1].
In previous researches in the ﬁeld of supporting reliability and fault tolerance in
WS composition, only low level programming constructs such as exception handling
(for example in WSBPEL) were considered. Exception handling normally is explic-
itly speciﬁed at design time, regarding how exceptions are handled and specifying
the behavior of the CWS when an exception is thrown. This approach is normally
used to manage logic faults, which are speciﬁc to WSs.
More recently the reliability and fault tolerance for CWS have been handled
at a higher level of abstraction, i.e., at the execution ﬂow structure level such as
workﬂows or graphs. Therefore, technology independent methods for fault-tolerant
CWS have emerged, such as transactional properties and replication.
Transactional properties implicitly describe the behavior in case of failures and
are considered to ensure the classical ACID (all-or-nothing) transactional proper-
ties. When transactional properties are not considered, the system consistence is
responsibility of users/designers.
WSs that provide transactional properties are useful to guarantee reliableCWSs
execution and to ensure the whole system consistent state even in presence of fail-
ures. The basic recovery techniques supported by transactional properties are:
• Backward recovery: it consists in restoring the state that the system had at the
beginning of the CWS execution; i.e., all the eﬀects produced by the failed WS
and the previous executed WSs before the failure are semantically undone by
roll-back or compensation techniques.
• Forward recovery: it consists in repairing the failure to allow the failed WS to
continue its execution; retry and substitution are some techniques used to provide
forward recovery; with the popularization of WSs, more and more functionally
equivalent WSs are diversely designed and developed by diﬀerent organizations,
making WS substitution an attractive fault tolerant choice for service reliability
improvement.
Figures 1 and 2 graphically show the diﬀerent recovery techniques for a simple
WS and for a CWS based on transactional properties.
Backward recovery means that users do not get the desired answer to their
queries. Moreover, this strategy may imply roll-back techniques, which claim for logs
in persistent storage to enable recovery after a re-start, reboot, or crash. The need
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Fig. 1. Lifecycle of a WS and the diﬀerent possible recovery techniques
Fig. 2. Lifecycle of a CWS and the diﬀerent possible recovery techniques
for synchronous logging slows down the execution speed during normal operation
and the reliability of these mechanisms depends on the reliability of the storage.
Forward recovery could imply long waiting times because of the invested time to
repair failures until the users ﬁnally get response. They can be diﬃcult to ensure
the retriable property to all WSs.
Replication of WSs is an alternative strategy to implement forward recovery
regardless transactional properties. This technique implies that several equivalent
WSs are simultaneously invoked and the response is taken from the ﬁrst successfully
ﬁnished one [28,1]. In the modern era of SOA, the cost of developing multiple service
versions is greatly reduced. In consequence, equivalent WSs designed/developed
independently by diﬀerent organizations can be readily employed as redundant al-
ternative components for building diversity-based fault tolerant systems. In this
context, a replica represents a functionally equivalent WS. Replicas can be used
for replication or substitution. Byzantine faults can be also supported by repli-
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cating the WS invocations and by ensuring all replicas reach an agreement on the
input despite Byzantine faulty replicas. Such an agreement is often referred to as
Byzantine agreement.
These strategies can represent advantages or disadvantages depending on user
requirements (functionality and QoS criteria), nature of services, and execution en-
vironment. Thus, they can aﬀect diﬀerently the ﬁnal execution result. For example,
for some users partial results may have sense, then, partial backward recovery in
the part of the CWS aﬀected by the failure should be the best strategy; some users
need the results no matter other QoS criteria; hence, forward recovery strategies
are appropriated in these cases. The decision of which forward recovery mechanism
(retry, substitution, replication) is the most appropriated depends on the execution
context, since for other users the total execution time is the most important QoS;
then depending on the context execution, backward or forward recovery can apply.
The unpredictable characteristics of WS environments provide a challenge for opti-
mal fault tolerance strategy determination. Depending on the scenario in which the
failure occurred, some recovery techniques are more practical, eﬀective, and eﬃcient
than others or some recovery techniques are not possible to apply. Consequently,
the execution engine should be capable to adapt fault tolerant decisions for meeting
diﬀerent user requirements and changing environments.
In this paper we study the impact of diﬀerent recovery strategies on the global
QoS of CWSs. We focus on CWS execution time; however, other QoS criteria
can be studied. This study is the ﬁrst step towards a dynamic recovery decision
method.
3 CWS Execution Time: An study towards a dynamic
recovery decision model
In this section, we present the basis to characterize the CWS and the environment in
terms of execution time in order to study the impact of diﬀerent recovery strategies.
This study considers the QoS of component WSs, the state of the execution at the
failure moment, and the eﬀect of the recovery strategies on the global QoS of the
CWS.
3.1 Preliminaries
QoS criteria describe non-functional WS characteristics (e.g., execution time, price,
reliability). The QoS values can vary for a single WS during its lifecycle. Hence,
there exist several techniques to keep these values of the QoS parameter as most
as possible updated. Particularly, execution time estimation for WSs can be done
with analytic, simulation, or test based techniques. In [14], there are proposed
methodologies based on a two-factorial analysis and a Gaussian majorization of
previous service execution times, enabling the estimation of a WS execution time.
In [16], the performance of WSs at diﬀerent levels (i.e., user level, network level,
hardware resource level and software design level) is analyzed. The user level is
the one corresponding to the execution time of the WS, which is calculated by
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the mean value during a certain period by invoking the actual WS. There is also
research in the estimation of the execution time forCWSs. In [25], a time estimation
method for CWSs is proposed based on mining historical execution information of
the component WSs in the dynamic environment. It takes into account the WS
execution time and the network transmission time.
Independently of the technique used for execution time estimation, we assume
that each WS is annotated with its estimated execution time, deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Estimated Execution Time for a WS. The Estimated Exe-
cution Time for a WS, denoted as WS estimated TT , is the execution time value
estimated through an estimation technique.
Therefore, the estimated total execution time of a CWS can be calculated in
terms of its component WSs and the execution ﬂow depicted by the structure rep-
resenting the CWS. Recall that in CWSs exist two basic variants of execution
scenarios: sequential and parallel. For sequential execution, the estimated execu-
tion time is the sum of the estimated execution times of each WS belonging to
the sequential path (Figure 3(a) and Equation 1), whilst for parallel execution,
the estimated execution time is the maximum estimated execution time of parallel
sequential paths (Figure 3(b) and Equation 2) [24].
tsp =
n∑
j=1
t(wsj) (1)
where, tsp is the estimated time of a sequential path with n WSs and t(wsj) is the
estimated execution time of a WS wsj .
tpp = max
1≤j≤m
(tspj ) (2)
where, tpp is the estimated time for parallel paths with m sequential paths and tspj
is the execution time of the sequential path spj .
(a) Sequential path
(b) Parallel paths
Fig. 3. Sequential and parallel paths
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Hence, the total estimated execution time of a CWS is bounded by its sequential
path with the maximum cost in terms of estimated execution times of its component
WSs. Note that real execution time can be also calculated with equations similar
to Eq. 1 and Eq. 2.
3.2 Deﬁnitions
We present in this section some deﬁnitions in order to formalize our considerations
regarding to the characterization of our study.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Initial node and ﬁnal node of a CWS. Let G = (V,E) be a
CWS; the initial and ﬁnal nodes, denoted as ni and nf respectively, are dummy
nodes added to a CWS, such that:
• V = {ni, nf} ∪ V ;
• ∀ wsi ∈ V : I(wsi) = ∅; E = E ∪ (ni,wsi); ni is the predecessor node to all entry
nodes (Def. 2.1) of the CWS;
• ∀ wsi ∈ V : O(wsi) = ∅; E = E ∪ (wsi,nf ); nf is the successor node to all output
nodes (Def. 2.1) of the CWS;
• I(ni) = ∅; O(ni) = | wsi ∈ V : I(wsi) = ∅ |;
I(nf ) =| wsi ∈ V : O(wsi) = ∅|; O(nf ) = ∅.
Initial and ﬁnal nodes have only control responsibilities and they are used only
to deﬁne the start and the end of the CWS execution.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Maximum Cost Path of a CWS. Maximum Cost Path of a
CWS is the sequential path from ni to nf which has the maximum execution cost.
Note that, there can be more than one maximum cost path in a single CWS.
Deﬁnition 3.4 Estimated Execution Time of a CWS. The Estimated Execu-
tion Time of a CWS, denoted as CWS estimated TT , is the sum of the estimated
execution time of each WS belonging to the Maximum Cost Path. Its value is
calculated according Equation 2.
Deﬁnition 3.5 Delta of Estimated Total Execution Time of a CWS. The
Delta of Estimated Total Execution Time for a CWS, denoted as Δ CWSETET ,
represents the maximum time allowed to exceed for the execution of a CWS, and
it is expressed as a percentage of the Estimated Execution Time of the CWS.
Δ CWSETET denotes the degree of fault tolerated for a speciﬁc CWS in terms
of execution time. This value can be given by the user or it can be set by the
system.
Deﬁnition 3.6 Tolerated Execution Time of a CWS. Let cwsi be a CWS,
CWS estimated TTi its estimated execution time, and Δ CWSETETi its delta of
estimated total execution time; the Tolerated Execution Time of cwsi, denoted as
CWS tolerated TTi, is deﬁned as:
CWS tolerated TTi = CWS estimated TTi +Δ CWSETETi
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Deﬁnition 3.7 Elapsed Real Execution Time for a WS. Let wsi be a com-
ponent WS in a CWS, the Elapsed Real Execution Time for wsi, denoted as
WS elapsed timei, refers to the real invested time since the CWS starts its ex-
ecution, from ni, until wsi is invoked.
With the WS elapsed time, it is possible to compute the variation between the
estimated execution time and the real execution time taken from the beginning of
the execution of a CWS until the actual invocation of each component WS. Note
that the WS elapsed timei can refer to the real execution time elapsed until the
moment in which wsi was invoked or until the moment the WS failed and an action
has to be taken in order to provide fault-tolerance.
Deﬁnition 3.8 Estimated Execution Time Left for a WS. Let wsi be a
component WS in a CWS, the Estimated Execution Time Left for wsi, denoted as
WS left timei, is the maximum cost among the costs of the sequential paths to
which wsi belongs to, measure from the invocation of wsi until the ﬁnal node nf of
the CWS.
WS left time allows to look ahead and calculate how far (in terms of execution
time) is the end of the execution of the CWS, with respect to each component WS.
Note that, depending on the sequential path in which WSs are, this measure could
be diﬀerent for diﬀerent component WSs. In a speciﬁc moment in the line of the
execution time, one WS can be near to nf , while other WS can be in the maximum
cost path and far from nf .
Deﬁnition 3.9 Real Executed Time for a WS. Let wsi be a component WS
in a CWS, the Real Executed Time for wsi, denoted as WS executed timei, refers
to the real invested time since the wsi was invoked until wsi ﬁnished successfully
or unsuccessfully.
WS executed time represents the actual execution time invested in the ex-
ecution of a component WS. If the component WS ﬁnishes successfully, its
WS executed time will be the real execution time. In contrast, if the component
WS fails, it will represent the time from its invocation until the time when the
failure happened.
Deﬁnition 3.10 Delta of Estimated Total Execution Time for a WS. Let
be (i) cwsj a CWS, (ii) CWS tolerated TTj the tolerated execution time of cwsj
(see Def. 3.6), (iii) wsi a component WS of cwsj , (iv)WS elapsed timei the elapsed
real execution time for wsi (see Def. 3.7), (v) WS left timei the estimated execu-
tion time Left for wsi (see Def. 3.8), and (vi) WS executed timei the real executed
time for wsi (see Def. 3.9); the Delta of Estimated Total Execution Time for wsi,
denoted as Δ WSETETi , represents the maximum time allowed to exceed the execu-
tion of wsi, in order to do not overcome the CWS tolerated TTj , and it is expressed
as:
Δ WSETETi = CWS tolerated TTi − (WS elapsed timei+
WS left timei +WS executed timei) (3)
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With the Δ WSETET the execution engine can decide at the moment when a
component WS fails, if it is convenient to perform any of the forward recovery strate-
gies without overcoming the tolerated execution time of the corresponding CWS.
In this sense, if a WS, let say wsi, fails and Δ WSETETi < 0 (from Equation 3),
it means that performing forward recovery will violate the restriction regarding the
tolerated execution time, then a backward recovery has to be performed.
3.3 Discussion
Since we consider a distributed execution engine and the execution control detached
from WS implementation, we can suppose that the information needed to decide the
appropriated recovery strategy is known by the execution engine at any moment for
each component WS. The execution engine is composed by independent software
components taking care of each component WS in a CWS. They communicate with
each other according to the execution ﬂow depicted by the Composite Web Service
Graph to send input parameters or control signals (see Def. 2.1). Thus, along with
input parameters or control signals, components of the execution engine can send
information needed by the model proposed in Equation 3. The basic metric in our
model is the WS execution time. However, WS performance can be inﬂuenced by
the communication links. We plan to incorporate the metric of data transfer in
future work to calculate our metrics more accurately, which in consequence, will
support better decisions in case of failures.
By using this ﬁrst version of our model, the selection of the recovery strategy
only considers execution time as the QoS criteria to conserve for a CWS. However, it
could be easily extended to consider user requirements/constraints of other QoS cri-
teria (e.g., price, availability) and use other context-information (e.g., data transfer
time, probability of faults for the remainder WSs, system reliability and conﬁabil-
ity). This kind of information should be useful to help in making better decisions
regarding the best recovery strategy choice. Thus, the model can be adaptable
and automatically conﬁgurable according to QoS user requirements and execution
context information.
Additionally, even if this model is designed to respond to silent faults, it could
be used to ensure the QoS at the execution time of the CWSs, not only in presence
of failures. If the execution conditions are tested before/after the execution of each
component WS, a decision for backward recovery could be made if QoS will be
violated. Imagine a part of the CWS execution takes much more time that the
estimated in a way the total estimated execution time is overcame, in which case
the execution has to be halted (a compensantion could be necessary).
As a ﬁrst step towards a model to provide dynamic decision for fault tolerant
strategies, our proposed model allows to conﬁrm that under diﬀerent environment
conditions and diﬀerent execution scenarios it is possible to adapt the best choice
of the recovery strategy when a failure occurs, and still guarantying diﬀerent user
QoS requirements. Next section presents our experimental study.
R. Angarita et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 302 (2014) 5–2816
4 Experimental Study
We developed an execution engine that uses our model to support failures during the
execution of a CWS. We use Java 6 and the MPJ Express 0.38 library to allow its
execution in distributed memory environments. We deployed the execution engine
in a cluster of PCs, where the execution control of eachWS is executed in a diﬀerent
node of the cluster. All PCs have the same conﬁguration: Intel Pentium 3.4GHz
CPU, 1GB RAM, Debian GNU/Linux 6.0, and Java 6. They are connected through
a 100Mbps Ethernet interface.
We automatically generated 10 CWSs by using the composition process pre-
sented in [6], from synthetic datasets comprised by 800 WSs with 7 replicas each
one, for a total of 6400 WSs. These 10 CWSs have 9 or 10 component WSs. All
WSs, including replicas, have diﬀerent QoS values. In particular for experiments,
we consider the following QoS parameters:
• Estimated execution time (used in our model asWS estimated TT , see Def. 3.1);
• Availability (WS availability) representing the probability of the successful exe-
cution of a WS (used to simulate diﬀerent environment conditions);
• Time reliability (WS reliability) denoting the degree of being capable of main-
taining the promised Estimated Execution Time (used to simulate diﬀerent envi-
ronment conditions);
Our execution engine simulates diﬀerent execution environments according those
QoS parameters.
We deﬁne two conditions: homogeneous environments and heterogeneous en-
vironments. In homogeneous environments all WSs have the same availability
(WS availability) and time reliability (WS reliability); while in heterogeneous en-
vironments, WS availability and WS reliability of all WSs vary. In both cases,
the estimated execution time (WS estimated TT ) for all WSs varies according an
uniform distribution.
We deﬁne four scenarios for each kind of environment. Table 1 describes the
eight scenarios. Column one enumerates each scenario, column two shows homo-
geneity level, denoted as hl (hl = 1 meaning homogeneous environment and hl = 0
means heterogeneous environment). WS availability and WS reliability for het-
erogeneous scenarios are shown as the rank of possible values taken. On each
scenario, the 10 CWSs were executed 1000 times; it means, 10000 executions for
each scenario and for all scenarios 80000 executions.
On each execution of a CWS, none, one, or more than one component WSs could
fail according their WS availability and WS reliability. Note that these QoS pa-
rameters are considered by our simulator to produce failures, they are not considered
in our model, which only uses WS estimated TT to make recovery decisions.
We design two set of experiments: (i) the ﬁrst set of experiments were conducted
considering only the backward recovery and forward recovery strategies and, (ii) the
second set of experiments additionally considers the replication strategy.
To illustrate how the execution engine works based on our model, we will detail
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Scenario hl WS availability WS reliability
1 1 0.8 0.9
2 1 0.8 0.1
3 1 0.95 0.9
4 1 0.95 0.1
5 0 [0.64 - 0.96] [0.72 - 1.0]
6 0 [0.64 - 0.96] [0.08 - 0.12]
7 0 [0.76 - 1.0] [0.72 - 1.0]
8 0 [0.76 - 1.0] [0.08 - 0.12]
Table 1
Execution Scenarios
all the steps in the execution process with one of the 10 CWSs; however, similar
results and conclusions hold for all other generated CWSs. Figure 4 shows the
selected CWS as example. Table 2 shows the WS estimated TT (in seconds) for
each component WS of our selected CWS. Its Maximum Cost Path is shown in
Figure 4 by the red component WSs (ws3, ws9, and ws10). We extracted the
Maximum Cost Path of the CWS example in Figure 5. In this case, the estimated
execution time of the CWS example is bounded by its Maximum Cost Path and is
calculated as in Def. 3.6:
CWS estimated TT = WS estimated TTws3 +
WS estimated TTws9 +WS estimated TTws10 .
CWS estimated TT = 34980 secs + 29650 secs + 2472 secs
= 67102 secs.
Note that, the failure of ws3, ws9, or ws10 will aﬀect the estimated execution
time of the whole CWS, more than the failure of any other of its component WSs.
We assume Δ CWSETET = 0.1 ∗ CWS estimated TT , which means it is inad-
missible for an execution of a CWS to take more than 10% of its estimated execution
time (CWS estimated TT ). Hence, for the CWS example, the tolerated execution
time is calculated as in Def. 3.6:
CWS tolerated TT = CWS estimated TT +Δ CWSETET
= 67102 secs + 6710,2 secs = 73812,2 secs
Let us explain the ﬁrst set of experiments with the CWS example.
Example 1:
Suppose ws9 fails when it had executed 18000 secs. Thus, we have:
• WS elapsed timews9 = 34980 secs (ws 3 execution time, see Def. 3.7);
• WS left timews9 = 29650 secs (its own execution time) + 2472 secs (ws10 execution time) = 32122
secs (see Def. 3.8); and
• WS executed timews9 = 18000 secs (see Def. 3.9).
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Fig. 4. Illustrative CWS: This CWS is one of the 10 automatically generated
Fig. 5. Maximum Cost Path of CWS in Figure 4
component WS WS estimated TT (secs)
ws1 8080
ws2 8020
ws3 34980
ws4 7570
ws5 12990
ws6 836
ws7 1388
ws8 13330
ws9 29650
ws10 2472
Table 2
WSs estimated execution time
As we showed before CWS tolerated TT = 73812, 2 secs, then from Equation
3, we have:
Δ WSETETws9 = 73812, 2− (34980 + 32122 + 18000)
= −11289, 8secs
Because Δ WSETETws9 < 0, the execution engine decides backward recovery. If
forward recovery is applied by retrying the execution of ws9 or selecting a substitute
that in the best case has the same estimated execution time of ws9, the expected
total execution time for the CWS will be exceeded.
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Example 2:
Now suppose that the failure was for ws10 when it was almost ﬁnishing its exe-
cution, at 2200 secs. Thus, we have:
• WS elapsed timews10 = 64630 secs (ws3 + ws9 execution times);
• WS left timews10 = 2472 secs (only its own execution time because the successor of ws10 is nf ); and
• WS executed timews10 = 2200 secs.
As we explain before CWS tolerated TT = 73812, 2 secs. Finally, from Equa-
tion 3, we have:
Δ WSETETws9 = 73812, 2− (64630 + 2472 + 2200)
= 4510, 2secs.
In this case Δ WSETETws10 > 0, then the execution engine decides forward recov-
ery, by retrying the execution of ws10 or selecting a substitute, because the expected
total execution time for CWS will be kept. When a substitute is selected, its esti-
mated execution time is the one considered in our model (Equation 3).
Note that in these examples, the faulty component WSs belong to the Maximum
Cost Path; however, the same procedure works for any component WS.
For experimental intentions, when backward recovery was decided, the execution
engine forced a forward recovery to show how much will be impacted the total
execution time of the CWS if backward recovery is not performed.
Table 3 shows the percentage of variation of CWSs Total Execution Time re-
garding its estimated time for the ﬁrst set of experiments in all scenarios as the
average of the executions of the 10 CWSs. Table 3 presents in:
• Column one, each scenario;
• Column two, the results related to executions without faults (NoFaults).
• Column three, the results related to executions in which forward recovery was
decided (Forward);
• Column four, the results related to executions in which backward recovery was
decided but the execution engine forced a forward recovery (Forward), showing
the impact in the total execution time if backward recovery is not performed;
• Column ﬁve, the percentage of executions where the time constraint was violated
(T imeExceeded)
Columns two (NoFaults), three(Forward), and four (Forward) represent the
variation for the CWS estimated execution time regarding its estimated time; for
example, the value of column two line one indicates that the real execution time
was 2.6% more of the estimated execution time.
These results show that there is little variation in the total execution time be-
tween executions without failures (NoFaults) and executions in which forward re-
covery was decided (Forward). These values are relatively small, which means
that with the forward recovery strategy, performing re-execution or substitution
of WSs did not have a negative impact on the whole execution time regarding
R. Angarita et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 302 (2014) 5–2820
Scn NoFaults Forward Backward T imeExceeded
1 2.6 2.8 42.45 48
2 3.5 3.5 48.80 52
3 2.4 2.9 40.98 14
4 3.4 3.9 41.87 15
5 3.0 3.0 45.92 46
6 3.7 3.6 47.18 44
7 3.86 3.91 38.24 15
8 3.1 3.43 38.88 18
Table 3
Percentage of variation of CWSs Total Execution Time with Backward and Forward Recovery
the time constraint. Total execution time varied at maximum in 3.91% from the
CWS estimated TT with an expected Δ CWSETET = 10%∗CWS estimated TT .
In contrast, CWS estimated TT was exceeded in more than 38%, when the model
suggested backward recovery but the system forced a forward recovery (Backward),
exceeding the time constraint in at least 14% of the times (T imeExceeded).
The second set of experiments additionally takes into account replication. For
component WSs in the Maximum Cost Path, at the moment of its invocation,
the execution engine evaluates with the model (as we illustrated in Example 1)
“what will happen if this WS fails”; if its failure will cause a backward recovery,
then the execution engine invokes simultaneously its replicas. It means, replicas of
the WSs in the Maximum Cost Path can be executed in parallel along with their
corresponding original WS, as shown in Figure 6. Only the answer of the ﬁrst WS
that ﬁnishes correctly is taken into account to continue with the execution of the
CWS. For any other component WS, not belonging to the Maximum Cost Path,
the replication decision is evaluated if it fails. If forward recovery keeps the total
execution time constraint, no replica is invoked.
Fig. 6. Replication of WSs in Maximum Cost Path
Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the results allowing the replication strategy to be
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performed using one replica, three replicas, and seven replicas per WS, respectively.
The columns Scn, NoFault, and Forward have the same meaning as in Table 3.
The column BackwardReplicat represents the percentage of the total execution
time using replication to go forward in the cases the model suggested backward
recovery because the time constraint was going to be violated. The column Replicat
shows percentage of the total execution time using replication. The column AllFail
represents the percentage of executions where the replication strategy could not
satisfy the time constraint because all replicas of one WS failed. The column
ReplicatNeed expresses the percentage of the total number of executions where the
result of a replica was used instead of the original WS, because it failed.
As in the ﬁrst set of experiments, the forward recovery strategy (column
Forward, in the three tables) did not produce a high impact on the total exe-
cution time, the worst case was 3.97% with seven replicas, while the tolerated time
is 10%. Once again, when the model detected that the backward recovery should be
executed and the system forced forward recovery, the CWS estimated TT was ex-
ceeded in more than 30% when 1 or 3 replicas were used (column BackwardReplicat
in Tables 4 and 5); means that the replication strategy did not help to satisfy the
time constraint because at least one of the critical WSs and all its replicas failed in
at most 15% of the times (column AllFail in Tables 4 and 5); with seven replicas,
it never happened that backward recovery was needed (column BackwardReplicat
in Tables 6) because the original WS and all its replicas failed (column AllFail in
Table 6). When the original WS failed and one of its replicas ﬁnished successfully,
the total execution time is not impacted a lot (column Replicat in all tables), the
worst case was 3.81% of variation from the estimated total execution time and this
happened at least 30% times from the cases in which all replicas where invoked
along with the original WS (column ReplicatNeed in all tables); this result shows
that invoking replicas in normal conditions can prevent faults without almost any
impact in the total execution time.
Figure 7 illustrates the percentage of executions where the time constraint was
violated under the eight scenarios without using replication (ﬁrst set of experiments)
and under the same scenarios enabling replication with one, three, and seven repli-
cas per WS (second set of experiments). Remember that in all cases, the model
suggested backward recovery but the system forced to forward recovery. As ex-
plained before, the replication strategy is chosen as prevention, if the WS to be
executed belongs to the Maximum Cost Path; therefore, there is more probability
of a successful execution of replicated WSs and then, been able to fulﬁll the time
constraint.
The diﬀerence between the bars in Figure 7 highlights the improvement achieved
by adding the replication strategy to the set of possible actions to perform in order
to maintain the time constraint. Table 7 shows the approximate failure probabilities
for a single node using diﬀerent numbers of replicas and assuming that all original
WSs have the worst failure probabilities considered for these experiments, which
is 0.2. This is the reason behind the considerable decrease on the time constraint
violation percentages showed in Figure 7, specially for executions with 3 and 7
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Scn No Forward Backward Replicat All Replicat
Fault Replicat Fail Need
1 2.77 2.81 37.82 3.10 12 42
2 3.53 3.62 38.15 3.81 8 38
3 2.62 2.63 30.65 2.91 1 33
4 3.49 3.52 33.49 3.54 4 33
5 2.62 2.63 36.21 2.69 13 35
6 3.44 3.71 38.7 3.44 15 35
7 2.63 2.63 38.85 2.68 2 38
8 3.39 3.44 37.24 3.45 1 34
Table 4
Execution with Replication (1 replicas)
Scn No Forward Backward Replicat All Replicat
Fault Replicat Fail Need
1 2.95 2.92 ∅ 3.03 0 34
2 3.68 3.72 43.54 3.10 1 33
3 2.93 2.94 ∅ 2.91 0 37
4 3.69 3.68 ∅ 3.69 0 32
5 2.75 2.80 42.11 3.11 1 33
6 3.44 3.44 ∅ 3.50 0 34
7 2.63 2.65 ∅ 2.71 0 35
8 3.39 3.44 ∅ 3.45 0 30
Table 5
Execution with Replication (3 replicas)
replicas.
All these experiments illustrate that if a wrong recovery strategy is executed, the
impact in the global QoS parameters of a CWS can be highly aﬀected. They also
show how suitable is to know information about the execution environment to apply
prevention strategies (as replication) that will not aﬀect the QoS parameters in
neither in normal nor in faulty conditions. Thus, a model that can take into account
context-information will help the execution engine to make decision regarding the
best recovery strategy, while global QoS parameters are maintained.
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Scn No Forward Backward Replicat All Replicat
Fault Replicat Fail Need
1 2.95 2.92 ∅ 3.03 0 39
2 3.68 3.72 ∅ 3.10 0 38
3 2.93 2.94 ∅ 2.91 0 33
4 3.69 3.68 ∅ 3.69 0 34
5 2.75 2.80 ∅ 3.11 0 39
6 4.00 3.97 ∅ 3.77 0 37
7 2.63 2.61 ∅ 2.71 0 33
8 3.39 3.44 ∅ 3.45 0 36
Table 6
Execution with Replication (7 replicas)
Fig. 7. Time constraint violation without and with replication
Note that in our experiments, results were not impacted by the homogeneity
level. Similar results and conclusions were obtained from both cases. This experi-
ence can represent another beneﬁt to mention of our model: it is independent from
how heterogenous is the execution environment. We plan to test our model with
more exhaustive cases to probe these preliminary suppositions.
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replicas failureprobability
0 ≈0.2
1 ≈0.04
2 ≈0.008
3 ≈0.008
4 ≈0.0016
5 ≈0.00002
6 ≈0.00002
7 ≈0.00002
Table 7
Node failure probabilities
5 Related Work
There exist many works related to fault tolerance execution for CWSs that imple-
ment a combination of several recovery strategies.
FENECIA framework [13] provides an approach for managing fault tolerance
and QoS in the speciﬁcation and execution of CWSs. FENECIA introduces WS-
SAGAS, a transaction model based on arbitrary nesting, state, vitality degree, and
compensation concepts to specify fault tolerant CWS as a hierarchy of recursively
nested transactions. To ensure a correct execution order, the execution control of the
resulting CWS is hierarchically delegated to distributed engines that communicate
in a peer-to-peer fashion. A correct execution order is guaranteed in FENECIA by
keeping track of the execution progress of a CWS and by enforcing forward and
backward recovery. To manage failures during the runtime it allows the execution
retrial with alternative candidates. FACTS [15] is another framework for fault
tolerant composition of transactionalWSs based on FENECIA transactional model.
It combines exception handling strategies and a service transfer based termination
protocol. When a fault occurs at run-time, it ﬁrst employs appropriate exception
handling strategies to repair it. If the fault cannot be ﬁxed, it brings the CWS
back to a consistent termination state according to the termination protocol (by
considering alternative services, replacements, and compensation).
In [4], a compensation workﬂow is built. This workﬂow has the lowest com-
pensation cost, which includes the cost of failed WS and the total cost of com-
pensating the previously executed WSs. There exist some recent works related to
the compensation mechanism of CWSs based on Petri-Net formalism [17,19,22].
The compensation process is represented by Paired Petri-Nets demanding that all
component WSs have to be compensable.
There exist some works that implement diﬀerent fault tolerant strategies based
on WS-BPEL technologies and consider highly dynamic environments as cloud com-
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puting. In [12], WS invocations are intercepted by an integrated software compo-
nent to the BPEL engine. If a failure occurs during an invocation, it is handled by
this extension according to policies that take into account speciﬁc characteristics of
the cloud environment. This solution is not transparent, it is strongly attached to
the speciﬁc BPEL engine implementation. In [1], a replication strategy is used and
a rollback workﬂow is automatically created considering the service dependencies.
An actively replicated platform is presented, in which all replicas of a WS are si-
multaneously invoked. Only results of the ﬁrst replica ﬁnished are accepted, other
executions are halted or ignored. The process of replication and coordination of
replicas is implemented transparently to users and independent to WS implemen-
tation.
All those previously described works do not consider the dynamism of the execu-
tion context environment to adapt the decision regarding to which recovery strategy
is the most appropriated. They implement speciﬁc and static fault tolerance strate-
gies.
In [27], it is deﬁned an adaptive and dynamic fault tolerance strategy based on
execution time, failures probability, and resource consumption parameters. Users
specify weights that represent their requirements over those three parameters. An
additive weighting function of the parameters. This work presents an experimental
study to show the feasibility of determining recovery strategies that comply user
needs. This work is the most related to our goals; however, it is meant for the fault
tolerance of single WSs, not for the fault tolerance of entire CWSs, as our study
does.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we have presented a preliminary model to dynamically decide which
recovery strategy is the most appropriated according to execution time restrictions.
We conduced an experimental study towards the deﬁnition of a more complex and
complete model to adapt the fault-tolerance strategy to context-information. This
automatic decision takes into account the impact of the recovery strategy on QoS
parameters and user preferences or system constraints, like the time constraint
presented in this analysis. The alternative recovery strategies considered in our
study were backward and forward recovery based on transactional properties and
replication to support forward recovery. Our experimental study demonstrates that
a model that can take into account context-information will help the execution
engine to make decision regarding the best recovery strategy, while global QoS
parameters are maintained. They also show how suitable is to know information
about the execution environment to apply prevention strategies (as replication) that
will aﬀect the QoS parameters in neither normal nor faulty conditions.
We plan to test our model with more exhaustive test cases to prove these prelim-
inary suppositions and to extend it to consider other context information and other
QoS requirements, as the availability and reliability of component WSs, in order to
better support the decision making. We also plan to adapt the model to integrate
other recovery strategies such as checkpointing techniques and tolerate other kind
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of failures such as Byzantine faults. Finally, we plan to perform experiments using
real data and uses cases.
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